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The building of employee distrust:
A case study of Hewlett-Packard from 1995 to 2010
Kimberly D. Elsbach, Ileana Stigliani, Amy Stroud
INTRODUCTION
On January 12, 1998, Fortune magazine published its first-
ever ranking of the ‘‘100 Best Companies to Work for in
America’’. This ranking was designed to measure employee
trust in a company based on five values related to trust that
were developed by the Great Places to Work Institute. These
five values included the organization’s credibility, respect,
fairness, pride, and camaraderie with regard to employees.
In the inaugural survey, Hewlett-Packard came in at #10,
and remained there in the following year’s survey. Yet, by the
fourth ranking, in 2002, Hewlett-Packard had completely
dropped off the list. Worse, Hewlett-Packard never returned
to the list during the ensuing nine years. In fact, by late 2010,
The Washington Post described Hewlett-Packard as a com-
pany with ‘‘undermined and frayed’’ values, and one in which
employee trust had been severely, if not irretrievably
damaged.
What happened to Hewlett-Packard? How did one of the
‘‘100 Best Companies to Work for in America’’ in 1998 become
so much less desirable by 2010? In particular, what happened
to employee trust in the company? Since employee trust was
the basis for the ‘‘100 Best Companies to Work for in Amer-
ica’’ survey, understanding how employee trust was affected
during HP’s downfall seems essential to unlocking the answer
to this reputation puzzle.
We will examine the story of employee trust in Hewlett-
Packard (called HP hereafter), through publicly-available
documents, from 1995 (prior to the first Fortune survey),
through 2010. We focus our analysis on signals about the
company’s values from both the behaviors and language of HP
leadership. We examined these signals for information that
might affect the five values related to trust measured by the
Great Places to Work Institute (i.e., credibility, respect,
fairness, pride or camaraderie), and identified over 300
statements or actions that appeared related to these values.
Our analysis suggests that HP’s fall from the rankings was
not due, primarily, to diminishing employee trust, but to an
increase in employee distrust. In particular, we found that HP
and its leaders provided signals of values that led specifically
to employee distrust. These values were organizational dis-
respect for employees, dissatisfaction with employees, and
unfairness in employee treatment. Our findings help to shed
light on the specific actions of organizational leaders that are
likely generate employee distrust. We illustrate these find-
ings in detail in the following case study and summarize them
in a framework of ‘‘Building Employee Distrust’’ depicted in
Fig. 1.
EMPLOYEE TRUST AND DISTRUST AT
HEWLETT-PACKARD: 1995—2010
We examine employee trust and distrust in HPin six stages. The
first stage, covering the years 1995—1998, sets the stage for
the initial ranking of HP as one of the ‘‘100 Best Companies to
Work for in America’’ and shows how and why HP achieved this
ranking. The second stage, covering the years 1999—2001,
illustrates how HP began to build distrust with its employees
through the actions and language that began with their
new CEO, Carly Fiorina. The third stage covering the years
2001—2002 reveals how employee distrust was further estab-
lished through a controversial merger between HPand Compaq
Computer. The fourth stage, covering the years 2002—2004
examines the entrenchment of employee distrust during
attempts to establish new values for HP. Finally, the fifth
and sixth stages, covering the years 2005—2006, and
2006—2010, illustrate a series of failed attempts to improve
trust (without first removing distrust) by another new leader at
HP, Mark Hurd. Before describing these six stages, we provide
some background on HP and its historical values, as well as the
business climate at the time.
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Background: Hewlett-Packard and the ‘‘HP Way’’
In 2011, Hewlett-Packard was a multi-national, high-tech
company specializing in developing and manufacturing infor-
mation technology (IT) including personal computers, industry
servers, storage devices, networking products, imaging and
printing devices, and software. The company was headquar-
tered in Palo California, USA, and had offices in more than 170
countries on six continents. HP was ranked as the top IT
company world-wide in revenues, and maintained over
324,000 employees.
The company — called the ‘‘godfather of Silicon Valley’’ —
was started by two Stanford Engineering graduates, Bill Hew-
lett and David Packard in a one-car garage in Palo Alto. When
HP went public in 1957, Packard wrote down the management
beliefs he and Hewlett shared, including a respect of and trust
in employees, an environment that fostered creativity, and a
flat management hierarchy. These ideals became known as the
‘‘HP Way’’ and served as a model for company culture in the
emerging Silicon Valley. Over time, the HP Way became synon-
ymous with a culture that embraced flexible work hours,
creative freedom, great employee benefits, and a sense that
layoffs would be used as only a ‘last resort.’ In return for this
positive culture, employees gave their all to the company,
even taking pay cuts to avoid layoffs, and remaining loyal when
other job offers came their way. By the mid 1990s, the HP Way
was known worldwide as a model for entrepreneurial corpo-
rate culture.
It is important to note, however, that HP was not without
challenges at this point in time. In the mid 1990s HP had five
major divisions: computers, electronic instrumentation,
medical instrumentation, chemical analysis, and electronic
components. Like most IT companies at this time, HP was
subject to increasing competitive pressures and squeezed to
reduce their costs across all of these business units. As a
result, HP’s leadership was constantly looking for cost sav-
ings, including moving jobs overseas (in manufacturing,
customer support, finance, and human resources) and redu-
cing employee services (such employee IT services and
human resources support). While it is likely that these
economic and competitive pressures put a strain on
employee trust at HP, our analysis suggests that it was not
cost-cutting measures per se that led to employee distrust.
Instead, as we outline in more detail below, it was the
communication and value signals that accompanied many
of HP’s actions that was central to building distrust among HP
employees. We begin our story of employee trust and dis-
trust at HP below.
Hewlett-Packard 1995—1999: Understanding
Employees’ Initial Trust in HP
From 1995 to 1998, popular press stories about HP revealed a
number of leadership decisions that signaled a strong respect
for employees by the company. For instance, in a pair of
stories accompanying the announcement that HP had
received a Distinguished Partner in Progress Award for its
operations in Singapore, several employees remarked on the
trust and respect that the company and its leaders showed for
its workers. In particular, employees reported that the com-
pany’s leaders gave them the freedom to decide how to do
their own work, which suggested a respect for employees’
abilities and integrity. As was reported in The Straits Times on
June 17, 1995:
Mrs. Anne Lim . . . has a particular liking for the way her
employer, Hewlett-Packard, tells staff what to achieve
but leaves the how-to-do-it to them. . . . ‘‘It’s the belief in
people, that they want to work hard and do their best, and
then recognition will be forthcoming’’.
Figure 1 The Building of Employee Distrust: Value Signals and Perceptions
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This type of respect was claimed as the reason that 47 of
the original 62 employees at HP Singapore had remained
since starting their jobs 25 years ago. The Straits Times
continued this theme in a second story, also published on
June 17, 1995. As they noted:
Mr Soo Kok-Leng, 43, HP’s director of human resources
(Southeast Asia) . . . explains, ‘‘There’s no feeling of hier-
archy here; everyone can talk like colleagues and not feel
threatened’’. . . . Overall job goals are made known, but
employees are left to achieve them as best they can. As
Mr. Soo put it, ‘‘We provide the resources and environ-
ment, then let them loose, with no fixed rules’’.
Other stories signaled company respect for employees by
highlighting the many programs designed by HP to give
employees flexibility in work schedules. These programs
showed that the company respected employees’ ability to
best manage their time. For example, one story, reported in
the Irish Times on November 21, 1997, noted that:
Hewlett-Packard Ireland Sales has introduced a programme
allowing up to 40 percent of the 100 strong staff at its
Blackrock, Co Dublin offices to work from home or other
non-office locations . . . ‘‘I hope that it gives employees
more choice and more flexibility. It makes us an employer of
choice and should help us retain people and keep them
happier’’, says Mr. Brian Kennan (managing director). . . .
‘‘This is not about the company getting a return on these
modems. It is about giving people more choice’’.
In addition, HP was portrayed as having high camaraderie
by its employees, who called the company ‘‘a close knit
family’’, and ‘‘a second home’’. This camaraderie was made
even more evident in a new television advertising campaign
that debuted in early 1997. As was reported in the New York
Times on January 3, 1997:
Hewlett-Packard gently pokes fun at its own engineers in an
effort to make its technology seem more accessible. The
ads, . . . propose wacky uses for Hewlett-Packard printers
and bear the slogan ‘Built by engineers, used by normal
people’.
Finally, HP was portrayed as credible through news stories
that showed how they followed-through on statements about
employee benefits and a commitment to work—life balance.
This credibility was noted by Fortune in its first ranking of the
‘‘100 Best Companies to Work for in America’’, published in
January of 1998. In describing HP (#10 on the list), the
magazine called the company ‘‘a trailblazer in people prac-
tices’’ and noted:
[HP] recently added domestic-partner benefits and nurs-
ing-home-care insurance for spouses, parents, and grand-
parents to an already lush benefits package. ‘‘They walk
the talk’’ when they say their people are the most impor-
tant asset, one worker told us.
In sum, in years leading up to HP’s #10 ranking in the Fortune
‘‘100 Best Companies to Work for in America’’ survey, the
popular media revealed extensive actions by the company
and its leaders that showed respect for employees, fostered
camaraderie among employees, and were viewed as credible
by employees. These signals came in the form of leader
comments, as well as programs and policies that were publicly
enacted and promoted by HP leadership. In particular, use of
terms such as: ‘‘belief in people’’, ‘‘open management style’’
and ‘‘respect for employees’’ clearly signaled that employees
felt respected by the company. In addition, terms such as
‘‘close knit family’’ and ‘‘second home’’ indicated that
employees felt a sense of camaraderie. Finally, phrases such
as ‘‘they walk the talk’’ strongly suggested that the company
was viewed as credible by employees. Given these strong
signals, it is not surprising that employee trust was relatively
high at this time (reflected in the high ranking in the Fortune
survey). Yet, that was all about to change.
1999—2001: Signals of Dissatisfaction as the
Foundations of Employee Distrust
On July 19, 1999 HP announced that it was appointing a new
CEO to replace retiring Chairman, Lewis Platt, who had led
the company for seven years. In a move that surprised most
industry analysts, the HP board appointed an outsider, Carly
Fiorina — former director of Lucent Technology’s Global
Services business unit — to be the new CEO. HP had rarely
appointed outsiders, especially in top management posi-
tions, and Fiorina was known for being highly competitive
and results oriented, which put her at odds with HP’s existing
values (i.e., the HP Way).
Almost immediately after being appointed, Fiorina made a
series of decisions and comments that indicated dissatisfac-
tion with current HP employees. These signals of dissatisfac-
tion became the foundation on which employee distrust was
built. For example, in an interview immediately following her
appointment, which was broadcast on National Public Radio
on July 19, 1999, Fiorina claimed that HP needed to be
‘‘reinvented’’. Specifically, she noted:
I think in general, the people of HP would agree that we
need to increase our sense of urgency, reinvigorate our
competitive spirit and focus on speed.
In addition, Ms. Fiorina’s use of the words ‘‘competitive’’
when talking about what needed to be changed at HP also
suggested that camaraderie was no longer a priority. In a
keynote speech at the high-tech Comdex conference later
that Fall, Fiorina also talked about ‘‘reinventing’’ HP by
taking more risks and moving more quickly. Together, these
comments suggested that there was something wrong with
the existing values and employee behaviors at HP, and that,
as a result, HP needed to be fixed.
Industry experts and observers took note of Fiorina’s
comments and predicted the end to the HP Way, including
its long-standing traditions of employee respect and camar-
aderie among engineers and other creative types. As one
observer at the annual Comdex conference (a large computer
and high-tech conference) noted in a December, 1999 article
in Electronic Engineering Times:
Fiorina . . . talked about a company culture that balances
radical ideas and inventiveness with traditional
approaches. Sentamentalist that I am, the words I heard
were these: The legendary HP way is dead. As carved out
by the founders, the old ways of careful deliberation,
conservatism and tradition are part of history, along with
the famous one-car garage that was HP’s first home.
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Technology consultant Mark Anderson went further, saying
earlier that year: ‘‘Picking her [Fiorina] is not about technol-
ogy or strategy. It’s about culture’’.
On January 10, 2000 HP fell to #43 on Fortune’s annual
survey of the ‘‘100 Best Companies to Work for in America.
Perhaps, sensing nervousness among HP employees about the
company’s impending ‘‘reinvention’’, Fortune reported:
New CEO Carly Fiorina promised that the new, streamlined
HP . . . would remain true to the culture of integrity and
respect known as the HP Way.
Yet, Fiorina’s actions continued to suggest that the old HP
ways would not last and that current ways of doing business at
HP were unacceptable. Thus, in the summer of 2000, Fiorina
launched a new global advertising campaign designed around
the theme ‘‘Invent’’ featuring the new CEO as narrator. This
new campaign was the first time that HP had produced an all-
encompassing brand message for its products (vs. having a
number of campaigns produced by individual business units).
In this way, the ad campaign mirrored Fiorina’s goal of
centralizing control over HP’s business units and removing
the tradition of entrepreneurship previously enjoyed by
these divisions. Other HP leaders’ comments about this
new ad campaign made it clear that HP’s prior focus on
individual business units was seen as dissatisfactory. As
was noted in an article published in USA Today on June 1,
2000:
Hewlett-Packard’s advertising had mirrored its decentra-
lized, entrepreneurial structure. The printer group had its
own advertising, the PC division sponsored its work and
the e-services unit ran its own campaign. Just as the
company suffered from what seemed a lack of focus,
H-P’s fragmented advertising had difficulty building
brand strength. . . . ‘‘The difference you’ll see from HP
now and in the foreseeable future is that this is an
integrated campaign’’ says Allison Johnson, head of com-
munications. [emphasis added]
These signals of dissatisfaction may have been especially
notable by employees because HP was not performing parti-
cularly badly at this time. In such cases, the need for
‘‘reinvention’’ is not evident to most employees, making
the push for such change that much more distressing. Thus,
it was not surprising that, in the next ranking of ‘‘100 Best
Companies to Work For’’ list, published on January 8, 2001,
HP’s ranking fell to #63. Employee distrust in Hewlett-Pack-
ard was apparently becoming established.
2001—2002: Signals of Disrespect and the
Growing of Employee Distrust
On April 19, 2001, HP reported that their earnings were
severely down and pay bonuses and raises would be suspended,
while managerial staff would be cut. Then, in July, employees
were asked to take voluntary pay cuts to fend off further
layoffs, which were eventually taken anyway (i.e., 6000 were
laid off in late July, 2001). Such actions, rare at HP, undercut
HP’s credibility as a ‘‘people first’’ employer, and signaled
disrespect for employees by reneging on a promise to forego
layoffs. This disrespect was made further evident by HP’s
board of directors when, instead of criticizing Fiorina for
her lack of integrity, took the unprecedented step of issuing
a statement declaring their unwavering support for Fiorina. On
August 20, 2001, Canada’s National Post reported:
Directors of Hewlett-Packard Inc. broke a tradition of
silence yesterday to declare their 100% support for Carly
Fiorina, the embattled chief executive, despite the com-
pany’s weak financial performance over the past nine
months. . . . They also gave their wholehearted support
to Ms. Fiorina’s changes to HP’s operations and culture.
This vote of confidence was important, because just two
weeks later, on September 4, 2001, HP announced that it was
seeking to merge with Houston-based Compaq Computer
Corporation, to form the world’s largest PC maker. Early
reports indicated that the merger would result in at least
15,000 lost jobs and a new culture at HP that would focus on
sales and services, rather than engineering innovation. In a
September 6, 2001 New York Times story, company spokes-
persons also indicated that HP was looking to become an
‘‘alternative to IBM’’ — suggesting an identity change from a
more specialized producer of computing products, to a large
corporate force in information technology.
Observers, analysts, and especially employees immedi-
ately protested what they saw as an end to the HP Way. They
also saw this move as a sign of disrespect for HP’s traditional
engineering culture. As was reported in the Electronic Engi-
neering Times on September 17, 2001:
I suspect electrical engineers will take more than their
share of the proposed [job] cuts of 15, 000 if HP’s acquisi-
tion of Compaq goes forward. . . . Fiorina implies she wants
to build the next IBM, but I doubt she has the taste for the
engineering costs. Maybe she really is poised to reverse
HP’s three-year slide in R&D expenditures as a percentage
of sales, but the move to acquire a company that spends
even less on engineering speaks otherwise. Fiorina once
courted PriceWaterhouseCoopers. I think that shows
where her heart lies. If the rice flies at this wedding,
engineers had better duck.
A tenacious and well-publicized proxy fight then ensued
when David Packard, eldest son of one of the founders of HP,
sent a statement to shareholders on November 11, 2001,
opposing the merger on the grounds that it would destroy the
culture at HP and that its accompanying loss of 15,000 jobs
was in stark opposition to the founders’ values. Packard’s
statement strongly suggested that the new leadership of HP
disrespected employees. As was reported in the New York
Times on November 8, 2001:
David W. Packard has slammed Carly Fiorina, HP’s CEO, for
a ‘weakest link’ style of management. ‘‘My father and Bill
Hewlett managed a company in a way that is was never
necessary to tell people, ‘sorry, business is not so good
right now. Goodbye’’.
These statements by Mr. Packard showed an alliance with
employees and a distancing of the founding families from the
current CEO.
HP then launched a series of attacks on Mr. Packard — who
was eventually joined by all members of the Hewlett and
Packard families in opposing the merger — through company
news releases. These news releases focused on the theme of
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change, and the notion that if HP stands still, it will be
overtaken by the competition. Terms like ‘‘bold steps’’,
‘‘withstanding challenges’’, and ‘‘charging ahead’’ were used
in these news releases to describe the merger and indicated
further dissatisfaction with current and past business prac-
tices. By contrast, opposing the merger was described as
‘‘retreating into the past’’, ‘‘incremental approach’’, and
‘‘attempting in vain to preserve the status quo’’, again,
suggesting a lack of pride and dissatisfaction in the current
organization.
While there were advocates on both sides of the merger
debate, most comments from employees appeared negative,
and suggested an increasing distrust in the company and its
leader. Many of these comments equated the merger with
layoffs and, like David Packard, suggested that making a deal
that required layoffs was not the HP Way. In particular,
employees complained that such a deal would signal disre-
spect for employees and a dissatisfaction with the long-
standing culture of HP. As the Christian Science Monitor
reported, on December 17, 2001:
[Employee] Judy Anderson won’t hesitate for a moment.
Her 500 shares aren’t that much, she knows, but she’ll
pledge them all against the effort to join with Compaq
Computer . . . she opposes any such merger solely because
it’s not the HP Way. . . . For many HP employees and
shareholders like Ms. Anderson, . . . the vote is about much
more than the bottom line: It’s about the soul of one of
America’s most storied businesses — the original Silicon
Valley start-up. . . . Laying off 15000 employees is not my
idea of the HP Way, agrees Ms. Anderson. . . . ‘‘If that
merger goes through, the HP Way is dead’’.
In apparent reaction to these claims, HP fell completely
off the 2002 list of the ‘‘100 Best Companies to Work For’’,
published on February 4, 2002. Further, at the pivotal share-
holder meeting in which the merger was voted on, Walter
Hewlett received a standing ovation, while Carly Fiorina
received boos.
The merger did pass, however, by the slimmest of margins,
meaning that the layoffs would happen, and that Fiorina
would have to soldier on with a new company, all the while
knowing that a great many of the remaining employees voted
against the merger. As one reporter put it: ‘‘With so many of
HP’s shareholders having voted against the union, her seat
will remain distinctly hot. . . . It will be hard to motivate
Hewlettites to give their best for the new firm. Some are sure
to leave’’.
2002—2005: Displays of Unfairness and
Entrenched Employee Distrust in the ‘‘New HP’’
Shortly after the merger, a voice mail message, that was sent
from Fiorina to Robert Wayman, HP’s chief financial officer
just prior to the merger vote, was leaked to the press. In this
voice mail, Fiorina was heard discussing the potential votes
of two major shareholders. As the New York Times reported
on April 16, 2002:
In the message Ms. Fiorina expressed concern about the
votes of Deutsche Bank and Northern Trust and is heard
saying, ‘‘We may have to do something extraordinary for
those two to bring ‘em over the line here’’.
While there was no conclusive evidence that Fiorina had done
anything improper to sway votes, the company’s image of
integrity was damaged, further supporting employee distrust.
This distrust stemming from a Fiorina’s apparent ‘‘unfair’’
play was expressed repeatedly over the following months as
employees and industry experts and former employees
lamented the loss of the HP Way and path, down which
the ‘‘New HP’’ was apparently headed. As one former
employee noted in a story published in the Electronic Engi-
neering Times, on April 22, 2002:
Much has been written about the HP Way, a standard of
behavior that emphasized innovation, a respect for the
individual and a culture that represented the best in all of
us. Bill and Dave built a company where engineers wanted
to work. There was something special about that place —
stand tall, feel proud, it was family’’.
This employee went on to explain:
The issue bothering many folks wasn’t the merger itself
but something else. It was about the end of an era, an end
to the belief that it’s important to be a great company to
do business with, a great company to work for, a company
that puts its people and principles first.
Finally, he lamented:
The HP Way is about yesterday’s culture. Now we live in a
world where principles are tossed out the window and
anything goes as long as it means making a buck. . . . It was
a better world when we lived it the HP Way. But unfortu-
nately, those days are gone forever.
Such comments were repeated in other columns and employ-
ees’ nostalgia for the ‘‘Old HP’’ became noticeable when an
‘‘HP Alumni’’ association was created in June, 2002, to ‘‘help
members maintain relationships created while working as
colleagues with the company’’.
By the end of 2002, it was apparent that the HP Way was
lost when a visible symbol of its tenets — open source soft-
ware guru Bruce Perens — was fired from the company. As the
New York Times reported on September 9, 2002, Mr. Perens
exit was both caused by and symbolic of the change in HP
culture and values:
Bruce Perens was a senior strategist for open-source
software at Hewlett Packard — an evangelist and rab-
ble-rouser on behalf of a computing counter culture that is
increasingly moving into the mainstream. . . . In the pre-
merger Hewlett, Mr. Perens . . . enjoyed a lot of indepen-
dence . . . ‘‘It was a pretty unique job that existed because
of the HP culture’’. Mr. Perens said. ‘‘I would still be at HP,
I think, except for the Compaq merger’’.
HP did not re-enter the rankings of the ‘‘100 Best Com-
panies to Work For’’ in 2003 or 2004, and while it improved its
performance in new areas such as wireless IT, it struggled to
meet profit expectations. By the third quarter of 2004, the
company announced that its profits would come in well below
Wall Street forecasts. Calling the failing ‘‘unacceptable’’,
CEO Fiorina promptly fired three executives in the computer
server and storage unit. Analysts openly questioned the
wisdom of the two-year-old merger and complained that,
while the merger cut costs, it produced none of the synergies
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that were promised by Fiorina back in 2002. Some even called
for a breakup of the merger, while others mocked Fiorina’s
statements from 2002, when she famously predicted: ‘‘The
wisdom of this decision will become more and more evident
over time’’.
2005—2006: Failed Attempts to Regain Employee
Trust
On February 9th 2005, Carly Fiorina, who had been at the
helm of Hewlett Packard for the last five years, stepped down
as chief executive officer — forced out by the board. Robert
Wayman, chief financial officer and a 36-year Hewlett-Pack-
ard employee, was named interim chief executive and
appointed to the company’s board, while Patricia Dunn, a
director at Hewlett-Packard since 1998, was named nonexe-
cutive chairman of the board.
The media reported the news as the end of ‘‘Queen Carly’s
reign’’; a reign during which ‘‘Her Royal Horribleness’’ had
tried to eviscerate HP’s culture and to alienate HP employees
brought up in the HP way, the ‘‘company’s once sacrosanct
corporate culture’’. Although also ascribed to the poor per-
formance results obtained, and to her inability to meet the
‘‘impossible expectations’’ to turn around the company, the
press insisted on the fact that the main reason why she was
‘‘ousted’’ was because her ‘‘celebrity style’’ strongly clashed
with the HP way.
In particular, a few days after Fiorina’s ousting on February
14, 2005, the New York Times, in an article entitled ‘‘Tossing
out a chief executive’’, retrospectively reconstructed the
different things that Carly did in order to ‘‘trample over
tradition’’ and as a result, show great disrespect for and
dissatisfaction with most long-time HP employees. These sins
included her negotiation of an exorbitant compensation pack-
age ($3 million signing bonus and a stock package worth $65
million), request to the board to pay the cost of shipping her
52-foot yacht from the East Coast to the San Francisco Bay, and
introduction of a different worker evaluation system that was
more rigorous and less generous. She was also criticized for her
decision to launch a $200 million marketing campaign to alter
the company’s brand identification, changing the company’s
name in advertisements from Hewlett-Packard to simply HP.
Finally, she cast herself as the star in a television advertise-
ment standing in front of the original garage where Hewlett-
Packard was founded and put herself forward as the face of
innovation and change at HP. Further she introduced new
cultural tag-lines, such as the ‘‘Rules of the Garage’’ and
‘‘+HP way’’, as modernized versions of the traditional ‘‘HP
way’’. Together these actions were listed as the most evident
signs that ‘‘she had failed to understand what she had set out to
transform’’.
In March of 2005, Mark Hurd was appointed as new CEO of
HP. Immediately, he made clear his intention to restore and
adhere to the original HP way. One of the first things he said was
that he had read ‘‘The HP Way’’, the seminal book about HPand
the culture written by Bill Hewlett and Dave Packard, thus
showing his understanding of and respect for HP’s roots and
heritage. But he also informed the media and analysts that
they would not be hearing much from him in the initial months,
as he was going to focus on correcting the company’s course.
He promptly communicated his respect for all employees in an
email, which was reported by Canada’s National Post on March
31, 2005:
I look forward to rolling up my sleeves, getting to work and
meeting as many of you as I can in the days to come.
Moreover, in a presentation that was sent live to all 150,000
employees worldwide the day after his appointment, he
emphasized the culture of teamwork and openness typical
of HP, which clearly signaled his firm intention to restore a
sense of camaraderie and pride among employees.
At the same time, the HP board emphasized those aspects
of Hurd’s style that made him look similar to the founders. It
signaled respect for employees and a commitment to camar-
aderie that had been part of the original HP Way. As suggested
by the words of board member Patricia Dunn in a press
release, reported by the National Post on March 31, 2005:
Let me just say, I think no one will be shocked to see Mark
eating lunch in the cafeteria. He’s a roll-up-your-sleeves
guy, and the more we talked with him, the more comfort-
able we became that Mark would be effective in working
with HP people. [emphasis added]
The months following Hurd’s appointment saw him adopt a
quieter and lower-key style in sharp contrast with Fiorina and
more in line with the camaraderie of the original HP way. There
were no more trips in the corporate jet to fly, no participation
in fancy and prestigious meetings — such as the World Eco-
nomic Forum’s annual summit — no fanfare, pre-announce-
ments or public lectures when he visited the HP foreign offices.
Instead, Hurd sought to show a strong focus on the main
company’s employees, customers and partners — signaling a
respect for these organizational members and their ideas. As
Hurd explained in an interview to The Business Times Singa-
pore on August 25, 2007 after his visit to the Singapore offices:
I’m not trying to make it a secret [that I’m here], it’s what
I do in most places that I visit. I come to see our employ-
ees, our customers and our partners, those are the core
assets of HP. So when I’m here in Singapore, I get to meet
our employees, I get to speak to them as a group. I do that
every place I go. And I will see almost 20 customers while
I’m here. . . . I do not have our people running around
trying to have me give big speeches. Unless they think it’s
really important; then we can set it up. But again, when I
think about how to run a business, I start by thinking about
our people, our customers and our partners. So my sched-
ule typically revolves around that.
Initially, Hurd’s understanding of and respect for HP’s
employees seemed to be what drove his decision making.
When confronted with the necessity to cut jobs, for example,
he invoked Bill and Dave’s toughness to explain the reasons of
his choice to HP employees, as reported by the Irish Times on
November 10, 2006:
He [Hurd] said many people have misinterpreted the HP
Way to mean its founders were ‘‘soft guys’’ who would have
avoided tough actions. They weren’t, but giving them a
tough guy image aligns them more comfortably to Hurd’s
approach. Hurd’s first step as new chief executive was to
cut 15,000 jobs — a task he says was his most difficult as
chief executive but which he says employees knew was
coming. He said he made sure to talk to them: ‘‘I tried
to connect the dots for them, to tell the whole story’’.
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He adds: ‘‘I think they always felt talked to. It’s not that
tough things don’t get done, but that they get done the
right way’’, he says, referring to the HP Way.
Nevertheless, he also made a series of decisions in sharp
contrast with the old values of the HP way — which earned the
label of ‘‘the Hurd way’’ emphasizing his autocratic leader-
ship style. First, he did not seem to show his satisfaction with
current employees in the same manner as the founders. As
reported by Fortune, in an article published on April 3, 2006,
only one year after his appointment:
He’s axing 15,300 additional jobs, about 10 percent of the
total; trimming R&D cutting back on HP’s ‘‘e-inclusion’’
program, which promotes computing in the developing
world; and freezing pension benefits, a move that puts
HP in line with most of the high-tech industry but markedly
out of step with its generous, paternalistic past. [emphasis
added]
In addition, Hurd decided to hire external executives from
Siemens, PalmOne, and Dell instead of internal HP leaders who
had grown their careers over many years at HP. Although the
practice of appointing executives from outside over internal
ones was not entirely new at HP, this action further signaled
dissatisfaction with current HP employees and executives.
Finally, he took actions that seemed to disrespect HP’s engi-
neering traditions. For example, although he stated that
‘‘There’s no question R&D remains the lifeblood of our com-
pany’’, he cut research expenditures by $100 million a year,
and concentrated almost all his efforts on restructuring and
improving sales.
As a result, employees remained distrustful of HP and its
leader at this point. As one employee noted, in a Denver Post
story from July 20, 2005: ‘‘Morale has definitely dropped. The
general feeling is: ‘Could I be next?’ [to be laid off]’’. Later that
year, at a memorial service for prior HP CEO Lew Platt, HP
employees waxed poetic about Mr. Platt’s care for employees,
and contrasted him strongly with all CEO’s that had come since
— including Mark Hurd. As the San Jose Mercury News reported
on October 19, 2005: ‘‘Platt . . . was seen by many as the last
chief executive to embody the so-called ‘‘HP Way’’, a company
culture that among its many tenets professed respect for the
individual’’.
To undo distrust, it appears that Hurd needed to do more
than simply engage in some behaviors and language that
signaled respect, satisfaction, and fairness with regard to
employees. He needed to convince employees that he was
different from leaders of the past. He also needed to get
them involved in building a new ‘‘HP Way’’ (more attuned to
current realities) that would be credible and acceptable to
long-time employees. Such disconnection from the past and
engagement in building a new identity for the future have
been shown to be critical to establishing employee identifi-
cation with a changed organization. Without involving
employees in undoing their distrust of HP leadership, Hurd
could not begin to engender new trust.
2006—2010: Continued Signals of Unfair Play and
the Downfall of Mark Hurd
Mark Hurd never got the chance to undo employee distrust at
HP. In a crushing blow to Hurd’s attempts to rebuild trust, it
was revealed in late summer of 2006 that investigators, hired
by HP, had used fake identities to obtain the private phone
records of nine journalists, seven board members and two HP
employees — a tactic called ‘‘pre-texting’’ — and put them
under surveillance in order to winnow out who was repeat-
edly leaking boardroom discussions to media. The investiga-
tion, known under the name of Kona files, soon deteriorated
into a real obsession with leaks. Suspicions fell on George
Keyworth, the board’s longest-serving member, and board
meetings became so fiery to deserve the label ‘‘the duel of
the dragons’’. When Tom Perkins, a powerful and long-term
member of the board, alerted the authorities, allegations
became a scandal that forced the chairwoman Patricia Dunn,
who had authorized the investigations, and Keyworth to
resign in September 2006.
In an attempt to contain the widening scandal, Hurd
called a news conference and acknowledged that the phone
tapping had deeply shocked many who admired the HP’s
legacy of integrity and responsibility, embodied in the HP
way. In particular, these actions showed blatant disrespect
for HP employees and board members, and damaged the
company’s image of ‘‘fairness’’. In response, Hurd claimed,
in a September 13, 2006 story reported in USA Today: ‘‘I am
taking action to ensure that inappropriate investigative
techniques will not be employed again. They have no place
at HP’’.
This seemed to be the beginning of the end for Hurd, as
observers commented that HP had completely ‘‘lost its way’’
in the obsessive rush to find the source of the leaks. As The
Sunday Times reported on September 17, 2006:
Last week, amid allegations of boardroom leaks, spying
and possibly illegal impersonation, one thing became
clear: the spirit of its founders may live on, but Hew-
lett-Packard has well and truly lost its Way.
In an article published on September 29, 2006, the Toronto
Star further emphasized the loss of HP’s positive identity and
any sense of pride that employees once had in the company:
What makes this story so sad is this wasn’t just another
company. HP was once a company that stood for some-
thing special.
While the same day USA Today denounced the profound
damage to HP’s credibility:
It was a humiliating scene for one of Silicon Valley’s
original tech giants, which prides itself on an upstanding
manner of business known as the HP Way. Suddenly, it’s
being compared to Enron and other wrongdoers. The
snooping scandal ‘‘would make Richard Nixon blush if
he were alive’’, says Rep. John Dingell, D-Mich. It was
‘‘a fine display of arrogance, cover-up and probably gross
stupidity’’. ‘‘It sounds like Watergate. It’s HP-gate’’, says
Needham & Co. analyst Charles Wolf ‘‘This thing gets
deeper and deeper’’.
While still hurting from this public scandal, two years
later, in May, 2008 HP announced the acquisition of the
leading global technology services company, Electronic Data
System (EDS). The deal — HP’s largest acquisition since
Compaq — set out to make HP the second-largest company
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in the IT Services sector, behind IBM, as explained by Mark
Hurd in a news release on the HP website:
The combination of HP and EDS will create a leading force
in global IT services. Together, we will be a stronger
business partner, delivering customers the broadest, most
competitive portfolio of products and services in the
industry. This reinforces our commitment to help custo-
mers manage and transform their technology to achieve
better results.
Yet, the acquisition of an IT service provider like EDS
showed a lack of understanding of HP culture and manage-
ment strengths. There was no attempt to integrate the
business strengths of EDS with the hardware capabilities
of HP. Instead, the acquisition was treated as merely a
cost-cutting proposition, and within months, HP announced
that 24,600 jobs were to be axed over the following three
years as a part of its integration with EDS. The cuts repre-
sented HP’s most aggressive move under Mark Hurd, and
were followed by the decision to impose staff salary reduc-
tions, and to scale back its 401(k) pension contributions for
employees, who would no longer be able to buy company
stock at a discounted rate. Hurd explained these changes in
an internal letter to employees reported by CNET News on
February 19, 2009:
My goal is to keep the muscle of this organization intact.
But we do have to do something . . . because the numbers
just don’t add up and we need to have the flexibility to
make the right long-term investments for HP. So we are
going to take action. We have decided to further var-
iabilize out cost structure by reducing pay and some
benefits across HP. My base pay will be reduced by 20
percent. The base pay of all other executives will be
reduced by 10 percent. The base pay of all other employ-
ees will be reduced by 5 percent. For non-exempt
employees, base pay will be reduced by two and-a-half
percent. Additional efficiencies, including changes to
the US 401(K) plan and the share ownership plan, will
also be implemented.
Together, these actions suggested that, like Fiorina, Hurd was
dissatisfied with many HP employees (who presumably made
up ‘‘the fat’’ of the organization that needed to be cut).
These actions did nothing to improve employee trust, and in
fact, added to the entrenched employee distrust at HP.
Mark Hurd finally resigned as CEO on August 6th 2010.
Another investigation had found that he had a personal rela-
tionship with a contractor who received pay from the company
that was not business-related. Although an investigation of
sexual harassment found no violation of that policy, Hurd’s
behavior further spoiled HP’s credibility image of ‘‘fairness’’.
As commented by general counsel Michael Holston in an inter-
view to the Toronto Star published on August 7, 2010:
[Hurd] demonstrated a profound lack of judgment that
seriously undermined his credibility and damaged his
effectiveness in leading HP.
His resignation, forced by the board, embroiled the company
in another Hollywood-style drama that added further to
employee distrust in the company. As emphasized by The
Washington Post on August 15, 2010:
The HP values have been undermined and frayed by some
of the leaders who followed Bill and Dave. Mark Hurd
promised to revitalize the HP Way. His actions — hiding
expenses to engage in a questionable relationship —
undermine the trust essential for a company’s sustainable
success.
EMPLOYEE TRUST AND DISTRUST AT HP:
LESSONS LEARNED
What can we learn from HP’s apparent development of
distrust among its employees during the first decade of the
new millennium? There appear to be two important lessons
that illuminate why employee trust turned into employee
distrust at HP. First, organizational leaders need to be aware
that, in addition to signals of respect and fairness (which are
often touted by business gurus as key values associated with
trust), signals of satisfaction with and pride in employees are
important to creating organizational trust among employees.
Second, leaders should know that such signals are not only
important to building and maintaining trust by employees,
but that signals of their opposites (i.e., disrespect, unfair-
ness, and dissatisfaction) may engender employee distrust.
We discuss these lessons below.
Signals of Satisfaction and Pride are Central to
Employee Trust
Conventional wisdom regarding the building of interpersonal
trust in between employees and leaders in organizations
emphasizes the signals that an organizational leader is com-
petent, benevolent, and has integrity. In this line, common
behaviors that have been shown to enhance interpersonal
trustworthiness include promoting a supportive employee
environment that show concern for employees (e.g., that
including showing respect for employee rights and interests),
displaying competent managerial practices (e.g., including
demonstrating knowledge and skills relevant to one’s job),
and fairness in decision making (e.g., giving reasons for
decisions, clearly defining rules and policies, honoring orga-
nizational commitments, sharing information widely, giving
timely feedback, and allowing employee input on important
decisions).
The HP case also confirms that respect (i.e., benevo-
lence) and fairness (i.e., integrity) for employees may lead
to trust in organizations and their leaders. Our findings
suggest, however, that perceptions of satisfaction with or
‘‘pride’’ in employees may be additional signals that affect
employee trust in an organization. Such satisfaction is dis-
tinct from respect or benevolence, because it signals a
positive performance evaluation of employees by an orga-
nization and its leaders. Given the paternalistic nature of
many organizations (and especially Hewlett-Packard in its
early years), it is not altogether surprising that such signals
of satisfaction are desired by employees, especially long-
time employees whose self-esteem may be strongly tied to
their job performance. In fact, because the expression of
admiration and satisfaction reveals emotion, it has been
shown to lead to social bonding and trust in interpersonal
relationships. Thus, an important implication of the current
study is that expressions of satisfaction with employees may
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be important to building organizational trust. Further, given
the positive performance of HP when initial signals of dis-
satisfaction were introduced by Carly Fiorina, such signals
may have been especially distressing and ‘‘untrustworthy’’
to employees.
Employee Distrust is Built Through Signals of
Disrespect, Dissatisfaction, and Unfairness
A second and perhaps more important lesson from the HP
case is that organizations may not only engender trust by
employees through signals about their values, but that they
may also engender distrust by employees through these same
mechanisms. In particular, our case study suggests that
behaviors and language that signal values of disrespect,
dissatisfaction, and unfair treatment with regard to employ-
ees are likely to not just lower trust, but actually produce
distrust. In this way our findings are in line with recent
thinking that suggests that trust and distrust are distinct
constructs that may exist independently of each other. These
more current models of trust and distrust suggest that orga-
nizations and their leaders may need to manage both their
images of trustworthiness and distrustworthiness.
The behaviors that we identified as producing distrust
among HP employees included: dismantling and replacing
traditions and symbolic practices that embodied company
culture (e.g., moving from independent business units to
centralized control, and eliminating the position of ‘‘open-
source software guru’’), reneging on promises (e.g., laying
off workers after they took pay cuts to prevent layoffs),
appearing to play ‘‘unfairly’’ (e.g., seeming to use unfair
enticements to get board votes for the merger with Compaq),
and un-privileging insiders (e.g., taking away perks and
preferential hiring from long-time employees, and the hiring
of Fiorina from the outside). Together, these actions
appeared to signal disrespect and unfairness (that ultimately
led to employee distrust) for long-standing traditions and for
employees in general. In the same way, other studies have
found that signals of disrespect and unfairness in interperso-
nal relationships may lead to distrust. For example, in their
analysis of patient relationships with physicians, Karen Cook
and her colleagues noted that ‘‘Negative behaviors [by phy-
sicians] not only fail to create the conditions that foster trust,
they can actually lead to active distrust’’. They go on to note
that one of the primary acts by physicians leading to distrust
is making patients feel disrespected. As one physician in their
study noted, ‘‘This whole thing about trust is very important. I
mean, how can you have a good relationship with someone . . .
if you always make the other party feel like they’re idiots’’.
In addition to these behaviors, however, our findings also
identified some new and important language signals that
portrayed HP as dissatisfied with employees. These language
signals included remarks, labels, and evaluations that were
disparaging of existing employee behaviors and attributes.
For example, labels such as ‘‘fragmented’’ and ‘‘plodding’’
and ‘‘incremental’’ were used by Carly Fiorina and other HP
leaders to describe HP’s existing business practices and
employee culture. Further, remarks about the need to ‘‘rein-
vent’’ HP, and to only ‘‘keep the muscle’’ at HP indicated that
leaders were not happy with the current performance of
many HP employees. Together, these remarks sent the signal
that HP leaders were, in general, dissatisfied with HP employ-
ees. As noted above, signals of satisfaction may communicate
the emotion of pride and admiration. Likewise, it seems that
signals of dissatisfaction may communication the emotions of
shame and disapproval, and ultimately lead to distrust. In
this way, our findings suggest that managers need to be aware
of not only the signals sent by their behaviors in managing
trustworthiness, but also by their formal statements and
casual comments.
Conclusion
The trials of Hewlett-Packard in building trust and distrust
among its employees provides a cautionary tale for man-
agers. Our analysis of this case, while certainly not the only
study, may be the first to connect the behavior and language
of HP leaders to the growing distrust among employees that
has plagued the company for more than 10 years. Our findings
suggest that organizations need to pay attention to the
mechanisms of building distrust as much as they pay atten-
tion to building trust. Further, our findings suggest that
signals of dissatisfaction with employees, especially through
language, may be an overlooked path to trust (and distrust)
by organizations.
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